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1 |  INTRODUCTION
When working on a task, people sometimes enter a state that 
is characterized by being fully engaged, up to the point where 
they tend to have very low levels of self-reflection and are 
hardly conscious of their surroundings. In the literature, this 
specific state of strong focus and immersion in the activity is 
often referred to as ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi,  1988, 2014). 
The phenomenon of flow is well known and is frequently and 
anecdotally reported in relation to the performance of artists, 
athletes and scientists (Eisenberger et al., 2005). Yet, when 
the conditions are right, flow may also occur in everyday life 
when being involved in more daily challenging or interesting 
activities such as during work or leisure time (Bakker, 2008; 
Csikszentmihalyi,  2014; Demerouti et  al.,  2012; 
LeFevre, 1988). The concept of flow was introduced in the 
seminal work of Csikszentmihalyi (1975) who observed peo-
ple working relentlessly on tasks without seemingly getting 
bothered by fatigue, boredom or other negative mood states 
or cognitions (e.g. self-doubt).
Flow has been the subject of many studies and has become 
one of the cornerstones of positive psychology (Nakamura 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Many scholars consider flow as 
highly relevant to human performance in various domains 
(e.g. Demerouti, 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2005). One of the 
limitations in the field, however, is that flow has mainly been 
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Abstract
Flow is a state of full task absorption, accompanied with a strong drive and low 
levels of self-referential thinking. Flow is likely when there is a match between a 
person's skills and the task challenge. Despite its relevance for human performance 
and the vast body of research on flow, there is currently still relatively little insight 
in its underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. In this paper, we discuss a set of large 
brain networks that may be involved in establishing the core dimensions of flow. 
We propose that dopaminergic and noradrenergic systems mediate the intrinsic mo-
tivation and activate mood states that are typical for flow. The interaction between 
three large-scale attentional networks, namely the Default Mode Network, Central 
Executive Network and the Salience Network is proposed to play a role in the strong 
task engagement, low self-referential thinking, feedback and feelings of control in 
flow. The proposed relationships between flow and the brain networks may support 
the generation of new hypotheses and can guide future research in this field.
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studied using self-report measures. Although the experience 
of flow is, of course, subjective by nature, an overreliance on 
subjective (self-report) methods limits the refinement of the 
construct and its divergent validity vis-à-vis other constructs 
such as motivation, or simply optimal task performance. 
For example, there is an ongoing discussion on the extent to 
which flow differs from other mental states such as mindful-
ness or strong concentration (Kee & Wang, 2008; Reid, 2011; 
Sheldon et al., 2015). In the present paper, we argue that in 
order to more fully understand the flow, it is useful to study 
the concept from a neuroscientific perspective. One of the 
advantages of doing so is that it forces one to be more precise 
in the conceptualization and operationalization of the dimen-
sions of flow. In addition, a neuroscientific approach opens 
up possibilities for new insights into flow and possible novel 
ways of measuring the phenomenon.
In light of the above, we consider it timely and relevant 
to further theorize on the neuropsychological structures and 
functions that may be associated with flow. The present paper 
is by no means the only or the first to discuss flow from a 
neuroscience perspective. More than 15 years ago, Dietrich 
(2004) published a theoretical paper on how flow may work 
in the brain. Following this article, a handful of empirical 
studies have been carried out testing the neurological struc-
tures that are activated (or deactivated) during flow. More 
recently, the book chapter of Harris et al. (2017a) reviewed 
the neurocognitive mechanisms of flow during sports. The 
current paper, however, goes beyond the extant literature by 
incorporating new insights from neurocognitive research, and 
providing a more in-depth discussion of flow in various life 
domains (e.g. not only sports, but also work-related flow and 
gaming), the possible neurological structures involved and 
their functions. But, first we will provide a brief summary of 
the basic dimensions of flow.
2 |  CHARACTERISTICS OF FLOW
The literature reveals an ongoing effort to refine our un-
derstanding of flow and its main characteristics (Engeser, 
2012). Several scholars have discussed the nine dimen-
sions of flow that seem to be consistent in the literature 
(e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Fullagar & Kelloway,  2009; 
Moneta, 2012). The first dimension is referred to as fusion 
of action and consciousness, implying that most of the cogni-
tive processing is directed at the ongoing behaviour. Second, 
and in line with the first dimension, is the high level of focus 
or concentration that is typical of flow. Third, there is a re-
duction in self-consciousness, which in this case implies low 
levels of self-reflection and not worrying about what others 
would be thinking of oneself. The fourth characteristic is 
the feeling of being in control. Fifth, individuals experienc-
ing flow have clear goals. The sixth dimension is feedback, 
because during flow one often ‘knows’ how performance is 
going. Autotelic experience is the seventh dimension and 
implies that the experience of flow in itself is pleasant and/
or rewarding and yields a tendency or desire to experience 
that state again. The eighth dimension involves a changed 
subjective experience of time—time often seems to fly when 
being in flow, which has been confirmed in a recent meta-
analysis of Hancock et al. (2019). The ninth dimension is the 
experienced balance between the level of challenge or task 
difficulty on the one hand, and one's skill level on the other 
hand (Keller et al., 2011). This latter dimension turned out 
be one of the key dimensions of flow because when a task is 
very easy, it is rather unlikely that one will experience flow. 
Instead, feelings of boredom and mind-wandering may occur. 
Also, when the task becomes too demanding or too difficult, 
it is likely that one will experience stress and a lowered sense 
of control (Keller,  2016). Thus, boredom as well as stress 
tend to disrupt any experience of flow. An intermediate level 
of arousal, however, seems to be optimal for experiencing 
flow (Peifer et al., 2014; Tozman et al., 2015). The nine basic 
dimensions of flow as described above are also summarized 
in Table 1.
One rather salient aspect of flow that, remarkably, does 
not seem to be included in the list of basic dimensions of flow 
is the high level of dedication, energy or vigour associated 
with flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Think, for example, of 
the gamer or computer programmer, engaging in their tasks 
relentlessly for extended periods of time. Another aspect of 
flow that was not mentioned yet is mood state. On this topic, 
there seems to be less consensus. Several scholars have ar-
gued that flow is, by definition, accompanied with enjoy-
ment or positive mood states (e.g. Eisenberger et al., 2005). 
However, it remains unclear whether one necessarily has to 
experience enjoyment during the flow state. As we will also 
refer to in this paper, it is more likely that flow is particularly 
associated with activating mood states—mood that enhances 
energy, drive, and persistence and that includes positive 
mood states such as optimism or pleasure, but also negative 
mood states such as anger.
Whether the flow characteristics outlined above are basic, 
or rather manifestations of an even more general process re-
mains an open question. For example, the feeling of being in 
control and knowing what to do and what goals to achieve 
possibly can be considered the subjective equivalents of the 
balance between one's level of skill and the task challenge. 
Yet, going into the details of the various dimensions of flow 
as emphasized in the literature and their relative contribution 
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Any neuroscientific conceptualization of flow, however, 
should take into account how several of these separate dimen-
sions of flow are established. For example, a neuroscientific 
conceptualization should explain how flow is accompanied 
with reduced introspection or thinking about oneself. Also, 
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the strong investment into a set of activities during flow 
suggests that conscious or unconscious decisions are made 
to strongly engage in one type of behaviour at the cost of 
neglecting other behavioural options. Thus, a neuroscien-
tific account of flow should also incorporate ideas on how 
the brain ‘decides’ whether to continue with the current task 
versus switching to other options.
In the present review, we will use the flow dimensions 
outlined above when discussing various well-known brain 
systems. The first two brain systems we discuss are neuro-
modulatory systems driving task motivation or task engage-
ment. Subsequently, we will elaborate on three large brain 
systems that are affected by the neuromodulatory systems 
and that play a role in the attentional regulation in task focus 
and self-reflection.
3 |  DEDICATION, PERSISTENCE 
AND MOOD DURING FLOW: THE 
POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF TWO 
NEUROMODULATORY SYSTEMS
Although high concentration, low self-reflection and forget-
ting of one's surroundings may be critical aspects of flow 
(Moneta,  2012), we wish to emphasize that before such a 
state occurs, at some point, one has already made the deci-
sion that the task is motivating or relevant enough to fully 
engage in it in the first place. Thus, the task either has to be 
intrinsically rewarding or has to be in accordance with the 
(short- or long term) goals one wants to achieve (Abuhamdeh 
& Csikszentmihalyi,  2012; Keller & Bless,  2008). For 
example, for academics, engaging in writing or conduct-
ing data analyses will more likely lead to flow, compared to 
engaging in unavoidable administrative work. In principle, 
there is nothing intrinsic in doing administration that would 
prevent one from experiencing flow; however, for scientists 
(and probably for many other people), engaging in it would 
simply distract from reaching their main and desired goals. 
In contrast, for administrators or accountants, administrative 
work may be central to their main occupational goals. They 
may also really enjoy such tasks and therefore, administrative 
tasks may more likely yield flow in this occupational group. 
More generally, if the conditions of intrinsic motivation or 
high goal relevance are not met, then flow is unlikely. As also 
mentioned before, flow does not tend to occur in tasks that 
are deemed boring, useless or overly stressful (Keller et al., 
2011; Peifer et al., 2014).
In addition, the literature suggests that flow is accompa-
nied with mood states that are activating and supportive of 
task engagement and goal-directed (approach) behaviours 
and mindsets (Bloch,  2002; Fullagar & Kelloway,  2009). 
Examples of such mood states are enjoyment, hope (i.e. ex-
pectation of success), energetic drive and anger. Deactivating 
mood states, such as stress, fear and perceived helplessness, 
on the other hand, tend to inhibit action and may therefore 
also disrupt subjective and behavioural manifestations of 
flow (Van der Linden et al., 2007).
Two neuromodulatory systems that may be involved 
in establishing the motivating dimensions of flow are the 
brain's reward systems (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999) and the 
locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system, or LC-NE system 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Benarroch, 2009). The former 
Flow characteristic Description
1. Fusion of action and consciousness Several aspects of the task are executed in ‘an 
automatic’ way
2. High Focus/concentration The person being fully engaged into the task at 
hand
3. Reduced self-reflection/absence of 
worrying/forgetting environment
Probably due to the focus, levels of thinking about 
oneself and worrying are low and non-task-
relevant aspects of the environment are ignored.
4. Being in control The person has the idea that adequate 
performance can be maintained
5. Clear goals The person knows what has to be done and what 
aims to achieve.
6. Feedback There is an ongoing (not necessary conscious) 
monitoring of performance.
7. Autotelic property The experience has rewarding properties (has 
some addictive elements)
8. Changed experience of time Subjective time passes by relatively quickly
9. Balance between skills and task 
challenge
The person's knowledge and skills allow optimal 
performance (at a personal standard)
T A B L E  1  The nine most basic flow 
experience characteristics
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has mainly been linked to flow proneness in a few previous 
articles (De Manzano et  al.,  2013; Niksirat et  al.,  2019). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature 
yet that has explicitly linked the LC-NE system to flow, in a 
theoretical or empirical way.
3.1 | Motivation and mood during flow: The 
brain's dopaminergic reward systems
Artist, athletes or experts on a specific topic may relatively 
often experience flow because they tend to do the things they 
consider highly and intrinsically rewarding (Abuhamdeh 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2012; Keller & Bless, 2008). Several 
subcortical brain areas are known to be involved in me-
diating the rewarding aspects of activities (Robbins & 
Everitt,  1996). For example, the nucleus accumbens is a 
well-studied structure in the so-called cortico-basal gan-
glia-thalamo-cortical loop (Ikemoto & Panksepp,  1999). 
The nucleus accumbens receives dopaminergic input 
from the ventral tegmental area, located in the mid-brain 
(Salamone,  1994). Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that 
plays a crucial role in establishing the rewarding and rein-
forcing aspects of behaviour (Wise, 2004). The nucleus ac-
cumbens is often considered a core component of the brain's 
dopaminergic reward system. Importantly, the activation of 
the nucleus accumbens and the accompanying dopaminer-
gic pathways tend to coincide with the experience of mainly 
activating emotions such as enjoyment, hope, optimism and 
craving (Buckholtz et  al.,  2010; Salamone,  1994). This is 
similar to the feelings that have been associated with flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2014).
In neuroscience, a distinction is typically made be-
tween the nucleus accumbens outer area, the shell (NAcc 
Shell), versus its inner area, the core (NAcc Core; Di Chiara 
et al., 2004). This is partly related to the functional distinc-
tion between liking versus wanting (Berridge et  al.,  2009; 
Salamone et al., 2007). Liking refers to the level of enjoyment 
that is experienced when rewards are obtained (e.g. getting 
food or engaging in pleasurable activities). The NAcc Shell 
plays a relevant role in this. Wanting, however, refers to the 
level of craving or energetic drive one has in trying to ob-
tain a certain reward (Berridge et al., 2009). The NAcc Core 
predominantly affects the ‘wanting’ as it plays a particularly 
relevant role in the cognitive processes and motor functions 
directed at obtaining the reward. In general, wanting relates 
to the willingness for effort expenditure directed at achiev-
ing some desired outcome (Salamone et al., 2009). The lit-
erature also clearly indicates that the NAcc as well as other 
structures within the dopaminergic systems are involved in 
weighing the effort it would take to achieve a goal against the 
level of reward it provides (Boksem & Tops, 2008; Salamone 
et al., 2018).
Given the characteristics of the brain's reward system, it 
seems reasonable to assign a role of this system to the expe-
rience of flow. Research that has explicitly tested this notion 
is scarce, but there is, nevertheless, some empirical support 
for it. De Manzano et al. (2013) showed that individual dif-
ferences in the proneness to experience flow are related to 
higher availability of dopamine D2 receptors in the striatum 
of which, among others, the nucleus accumbens is a substruc-
ture. Dopaminergic activity in the striatum mediates reward 
processing. Moreover, individual differences in the D2 recep-
tor density and availability have been linked to traits that have 
shown to relate to flow, such as low impulsivity and high 
emotion regulation abilities (Blasi et  al.,  2009). Although 
flow proneness is not the same as the actual experience of 
flow, the fact that dopamine pathways have been found to 
play a role in flow proneness seems to suggest that they may 
also be involved in the subjective experience of flow itself.
Other more direct, empirical support for the role of the 
reward systems in flow experience comes from the studies 
of Ulrich et al. (2014), Ulrich et al. (2016) who used a with-
in-person design in which participants were tested (they had 
to do calculations) in a brain scanner (i.e. MRI) during three 
different conditions—a boredom condition, in which the task 
was relatively easy, an overload condition, in which the task 
was too difficult for the participants' skill levels and a con-
dition that was assumed to induce flow due to the matching 
of task difficulty and participant's skill level. The flow con-
dition was related to significantly increased activity in the 
basal ganglia, including the nucleus accumbens. Obviously, 
the task that Ulrich et al. used was very specific (i.e. mental 
calculations) and possibly cannot be directly generalized to 
other flow-inducing activities such as sports activities, play-
ing music or creating art. Yet, based on the idea that flow can 
occur in a wide range of tasks in which skills and challenges 
are matched, Ulrich et al.'s findings may be indicative of what 
largely happens in the brain during flow in general.
Additional, albeit more indirect, support for the role of 
dopaminergic systems comes from a study in which the ten-
dency to be fully absorbed in their work (which resembles 
flow-like states) was related to individual differences in 
markers of the sensitivity of the behavioural reward system 
(Van der Linden et al., 2007).
Conceptually, a direct link between flow and the brain re-
ward systems seems to make sense (Weber et al., 2009). Tasks 
that have the potential to activate reward systems will ‘ener-
gize’ behaviour directed at that task and is accompanied with 
a strong task engagement and intrinsic motivation (Berridge 
et al., 2009). At this point, it is relevant to mention that once 
the reward systems are very active, they also tend to diminish 
feelings of fatigue, pain or other subjective discomfort. For 
example, ample research has confirmed that substances that 
directly or indirectly enhance the brain dopamine's levels, 
such as coffee or amphetamine, also tend to counter fatigue 
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(Stahl, 2002). Those properties of the brain's dopaminergic 
pathways fit nicely with observations that people in a state of 
flow can work relentlessly for a considerable amount of time 
without feeling or showing clear signs of discomfort, resis-
tance (e.g. experienced as excessive effortfulness) or fatigue 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), as any parent with a teenage gamer 
at home may easily acknowledge.
Finally, stimuli or activities that can activate reward sys-
tems usually also reinforce the desire to experience that same 
state again (Di Chiara, 2002), which to some extent is similar 
to how an addiction works (although it may be less intense). 
This aligns with the idea of flow as an autotelic experi-
ence—a state that is pleasurable in itself and leads to the de-
sire to experience that same state again in the future (Fullagar 
& Kelloway, 2009)—which suggests that indeed some level 
of reward reinforcement, mediated by the brain reward sys-
tems, seems to occur in flow.
The notion that the brain's reward systems are involved in 
flow may contribute to more fundamental and new insights 
into the nature of the construct, and may also generate new 
research questions. To illustrate, many previous studies re-
ported positive mood associated with flow (Bloch,  2002; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Eisenberger et al., 2005). However, 
given that this was mainly established using surveys that par-
ticipants filled in after they experienced flow, those findings 
may particularly relate to the liking aspect of reward—it may 
show how satisfied/happy people feel with the reward they 
have already received from the flow. However, during the 
actual flow experience, the state may be particularly associ-
ated with the wanting aspect of motivation. This aspect more 
strongly relates to activation and drive instead of satisfaction 
(Berridge et  al.,  2009; Salamone et  al.,  2009). In line with 
this, it would be useful if future research would investigate 
the possible differential roles of wanting versus liking in flow 
and their associated neurological structures (e.g. NAcc core 
versus NAcc shell).
3.2 | Continuing or stopping? A role of the 
locus-coeruleus norepinephrine system in flow?
Traditionally, dopaminergic reward systems are presumed 
to play a role in the direction of actions—that is, which ac-
tivities to focus on—and in decisions on whether or not to 
continue with the current line of actions, based on the trade-
off between the costs and rewards of actions (Boksem & 
Tops,  2008; Ikemoto & Panksepp,  1999). More recently, 
however, scholars have also emphasized the possible role 
of the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system in 
such decisions (Aston-Jones & Cohen,  2005). The LC is 
a small nucleus in the pons of the brain and is the princi-
ple site of central norepinephrine (noradrenaline) release 
(Benarroch,  2009). The LC has widespread connections to 
other brain areas such as the amygdala and hippocampus, the 
cerebellum, the cerebral cortex and also the ventral tegmental 
area, which we identified in the previous section as the origin 
of dopamine cells that feed into other reward-related struc-
tures (Ranjbar-Slamloo & Fazlali, 2020).
In the earlier literature, it was assumed that the LC-NE 
system mainly had the relatively simple function of regulating 
the brain's arousal levels (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 1993). 
It plays a significant role in sleep and wakefulness. However, 
it has now been established that the LC-NE system has more 
elaborate functions involving motivation and attention. In 
their seminal review, Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005) high-
lighted the role of the LC-NE system in task engagement. As 
such, a link with flow is plausible because a very strong task 
engagement is seen as one of the most salient characteristics 
of flow (Bakker,  2008). In fact, as we will explain below, 
there are various characteristics of the LC-NE system that 
overlap quite well with important features of flow.
One presumed key function of the LC-NE system is to 
support decisions on whether to maintain focus on the task 
at hand, or switch attention to other task and stimuli (Cohen 
et  al.,  2007). Such decisions are based on the balance be-
tween the current or future rewards involved in a set of activ-
ities versus its cost, such as resource depletion. If the balance 
is in favour of the rewards, one will maintain task focus. If 
the costs start to outweigh the rewards, then one tends to 
withdraw from the task (Boksem & Tops,  2008; Kurzban 
et  al.,  2013). Several empirical studies indeed support the 
idea that the LC-NE system plays a pivotal role in the balanc-
ing between engagement versus disengagement (Aston-Jones 
et  al.,  2000). It would go beyond the scope of the present 
review to provide a detailed account of how the LC-NE sys-
tem underlies such decisions. Essentially, the idea is that the 
LC-NE system may regulate an attentional filter, based on 
configurations of tonic (baseline) NE release versus phasic 
(stimulus-driven) NE release (Aston-Jones et al., 2000). If a 
task is deemed rewarding enough, then the LC-NE system 
produces a moderate level of baseline NE, with relatively 
strong stimulus-driven pulses of NE release. In this config-
uration, a person has a sufficient level of arousal (i.e. is alert 
enough) to engage in the task, and also is highly attentive to 
task-related events. Moreover, responses to non-task-relevant 
stimuli are low, implying low distraction. Aston-Jones and 
Cohen (2005) refer to this set of behavioural characteristics 
as the ‘task engagement mode’. The overlap with flow may 
be apparent because flow is indeed characterized by a strong 
task engagement, persistence (i.e. continuous exploitation) 
and the neglect of almost everything that is not task related 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). If the reward/cost balance becomes 
unfavourable, the LC-NE system changes its NE output such 
that task disengagement is likely.
There are two different ways in which the LC-NE can 
mediate task disengagement, which are associated with 
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two different task modes (see Figure 1). First, it can lower 
the baseline NE output as well as phasic NE responses. 
This results in a ‘general inattentiveness mode’ (Hopstaken 
et al., 2015). The second option is that it increases the base-
line NE output but also the responsiveness of phasic NE re-
lease. This implies that general arousal is high and one tends 
to respond to task-relevant as well as task-irrelevant stimuli. 
This results in an overall ‘distractiveness mode’, which can 
also be described as a tendency to explore the environment 
for more interesting options than the current activities.
Regarding the LC-NE system's role in balancing en-
gagement versus disengagement, there is a set of empirical 
findings that fits well with one of the key dimensions of 
flow, namely the balance between skills and challenge (e.g. 
Nieuwenhuis et  al.,  2005). That is, in the LC-NE system, 
the relevance of the skill/challenge match has been studied 
by systematically balancing the levels of effort for different 
levels of reward (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). In doing so, 
it has been found that situations in which the task difficulty 
(or task challenge) is high, but still doable, the LC-NE sys-
tem tends to go into the ‘task engagement mode’ (depicted 
in Figure  1). Yet, at some point, the task becomes so dif-
ficult that further investment in it seems less useful, even 
though the potential reward (e.g. the monetary incentive) is 
higher. Under that condition, the LC-NE system changes its 
output to higher baseline NE and a more general phasic NE 
responsiveness. This implies the task disengagement and/or 
distraction modes.
To the best of our knowledge, the previous literature has 
not made an explicit link between flow and the LC-NE sys-
tem. We, nevertheless, argue that such a link has considerable 
potential as one of the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms 
regulating flow, particularly because it is typically discussed 
in the context of task engagement. Note that, the inverted 
U-curve of the LC-NE system, with its boredom, engagement 
and stress/distraction modes as depicted in Figure 1, seems 
highly similar to the inverted U-curve of arousal and flow as 
described by Peifer et al. (2014). This overlap is in line with 
the hypothesis that the LC-NE system is indeed involved in 
flow. Any contribution of the LC-NE system to flow would 
obviously not be in isolation, but rather in collaboration with 
various other brain systems and structures. It is relevant 
to note here that various dopamine systems have descend-
ing connections to the LC-NE system (Ranjbar-Slamloo & 
Fazlali, 2020). Dopamine is also a precursor of NE. In terms 
of the psychological processes involved, dopaminergic sys-
tems may serve as information on the task's rewarding as-
pects, after which the LC-NE system can switch to, or stay 
in, an engage or disengage mode. In the current context, this 
would suggest that the two brain systems (i.e. reward system 
and the LC-NE) may play a role in initiating, maintaining and 
disrupting a state of flow (see also below).
3.3 | From neuromodulatory systems to 
further cognitive processing in flow: Large-
scale attentional brain networks
In the previous sections, we focused on how dopaminergic 
and noradrenergic systems may underlie the motivation, 
mood states and task engagement in flow. We analysed 
how various dimensions of flow, such as intrinsic motiva-
tion, focus and high energy, may be intrinsically linked to 
the established characteristics of those systems. Yet, in order 
to more fully understand the wide range of behavioural and 
subjective facets of flow, it would be useful to take another 
subset of large-scale brain networks into account—a subset 
that is assumed to regulate attention and may be connected 
to flow. Specifically, the networks we will further discuss 
have been theoretically linked to various cognitive processes 
such as controlled versus automatic cognitive processing and 
self-awareness.
4 |  LARGE-SCALE NETWORKS 
INVOLVED IN FLOW
Trying to explain a relatively broad phenomenon, such as 
flow, in terms of its underlying brain structures and functions 
can be considered an extensive challenge by any means. The 
brain is an incredibly complex organ with numerous specific 
areas that have distinct—and often not yet fully understood—
functions. Moreover, many of the brain's functions are es-
tablished by connections and interactions between various 
F I G U R E  1  (a) Inverted U-curve of 
performance and arousal. (b) The Inverted 
U-curve in terms of tonic NE and pulses of 
NE to task relevant and irrelevant stimuli
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areas. Therefore, it is unlikely that a multifaceted state, such 
as flow, would be linked to a discrete number of brain areas 
or functions. A more useful approach is to discuss the topic 
in terms of several of the identified, so-called, larger-scale 
attentional brain networks (Bressler & Menon, 2010). These 
are sets of brain areas that are known to have close intercon-
nections, are often activated (or de-activated) in tandem and 
that are ascribed relatively broad functionalities. Often those 
systems receive input from and are regulated by the same 
neuromodulatory (DA and NE) systems we have already dis-
cussed above.
Here, we will focus on three of those systems, namely 
the Default Mode Network (DMN), the Central Executive 
Network (CEN) and the Salience Network (SN). For each 
network, we will start with a short general description of its 
nature and function, followed by its proposed relation to flow.
4.1 | The Default Mode Network: Reduced 
self-awareness and feedback in flow?
4.1.1 | Basic characteristics of the DMN
Early brain imagining studies have discovered that during 
periods when participants are not engaged in cognitive or 
other external tasks, certain brain areas tend to become more 
activated (e.g. Shulman et al., 1997). This network of areas 
was labelled the Default Mode Network (DMN: Buckner 
et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). The largest brain areas as-
sociated with the DMN are the posterior cingulate cortex and 
precuneus, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the an-
gular gyrus (AG), see also Figure 2.
Two of the main aspects of the DMN are assumed to 
be self-referential processing and autobiographic memory 
(Davey et al., 2016; Gusnard et al., 2001). It is particularly 
active when one is thinking about oneself, in past, current 
or future situations (e.g. anticipating outcomes, planning). 
As such, the DMN has also been connected to mind-wan-
dering (Christoff et al., 2009; Kucyi & Davis, 2014). Such 
mind-wandering or ruminations should be considered as spe-
cific instances of the general function of the DMN to cog-
nitively simulate future scenarios (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; 
Tops et al., 2014).
Decreased activation of the DMN during task engage-
ment may be a sign of reduced mind-wandering. In light of 
the foregoing, findings of increased activation of the DMN 
during social activities (Schilbach et  al.,  2008) also make 
sense because in those situations, thinking about oneself and 
possible outcomes of one's behaviour are relevant for ade-
quate social performance (e.g. what is the potential impact of 
the things I am saying?).
Although there is some debate about the structure and 
nature of the DMN, and whether or not it is active in task 
processing (e.g. Elton & Gao, 2015), many studies have con-
firmed the above-explained link between the DMN and ‘in-
ward directed’ processing or self-referential thinking (Davey 
et al., 2016).
4.1.2 | The DMN and flow
Given the general characteristics of the DMN, several propo-
sitions can be formulated about how this network may relate 
to the subjective experience of flow. The most obvious rela-
tion is that a reduction in worries or thinking about oneself 
(in negative or positive sense) during flow seems to impli-
cate reduced DMN activity. Earlier neuroimaging studies 
confirmed this to some extent. Ulrich et  al.  (2014), Ulrich 
et al. (2016) conducted several laboratory tests in which par-
ticipants were scanned in an MRI while working on task con-
ditions that either induced boredom, flow or stress (also note 
the overlap with the three modes of the LC-NE system dis-
cussed in Section 3.2). The mPFC, an important component 
of the DMN, showed an inverted U-shaped pattern in which 
activation was lowest in the flow condition (and highest in 
the boredom condition).
A proposition we wish to make in this paper is that the 
lowered activation of the DMN during flow is established 
through, at least, two different pathways. The first one is that 
reduced negative stress (in which one has feelings and ideas 
of losing control) and activating mood states during flow en-
sure that the DMN does not become overly active. This idea 
will be outlined in the present section. The second pathway 
is that the high task focus that is characteristic of the absorp-
tion component of flow may take away processing time or 
resources from the DMN. This notion is discussed in the next 
F I G U R E  2  The main brain structures 
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section, when we also elaborate on the role of another net-
work, namely the CEN in flow.
Regarding the first pathway, interestingly, in their flow 
condition, Ulrich et al. (2014) also found lowered activation 
of the amygdala. This structure is not a direct component of 
the DMN, yet is assumed to be strongly causally linked to its 
activation (Sylvester et al., 2020). The amygdala reacts vig-
orously to threatening situations, thereby inducing thoughts 
about possible future negative consequences for the self. 
Experiencing threat or being fearful of negative outcomes 
stands in sharp contrast to the experience of flow. This has 
been confirmed by psychophysiological studies showing that 
flow is associated with low sympathetic activity of the auto-
nomic nervous system, suggesting low stress levels (Harmat 
et al., 2015). When one is performing a task on which one's 
capabilities are up to the challenge, then one often has the 
feeling of being in control of the situation, or making prog-
ress towards one's goals. However, if signs appear that one 
can no longer adequately deal with the task requirements (e.g. 
it becomes too difficult), then the possibility of not obtaining 
goals becomes a reality and sympathetic activity increases, 
likely induced by, among others, the LC-NE system (Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005).
Once the idea of losing control starts to develop, any ex-
perience of flow will get disrupted. This is accompanied by a 
reduction in task focus and increased distractibility (see also 
the section on LC-NE). The task disengagement, accompa-
nied with the higher arousal, will probably induce self-re-
flection and in that case, the DMN may become more active 
again. Although, in principle, such reflection can be positive 
or negative, in case of a task that is too difficult, the reflection 
often becomes manifest in an increase in worrying.
The hypothesis that the DMN is least active when in flow 
compared to working on boring or too difficult tasks was 
also recently supported in one of our own studies (Blinded 
For Review), in which we tested EEG power patterns during 
three conditions—a boring condition, a flow condition and 
an overly difficult condition. Particularly, electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) measures in the 8–12 Hz frequency domain, that 
is, alpha power, suggested a pattern in which the activity was 
low in the flow condition. Several scholars have convincingly 
argued and shown that alpha power partly reflects activity of 
the DMN (Knyazev, 2013; Knyazev et al., 2012).
4.2 | The central executive network: 
Focusing on the task
4.2.1 | Basic characteristics of the CEN
In some regards, the CEN (D'esposito et  al.,  1995) is the 
opposite of the DMN. The CEN consists of an array of 
strongly interconnected brain areas that are mainly active 
when engaging in ‘external’ cognitive processing (Bressler 
& Menon, 2010). That is, when one is engaged in tasks that 
require the active maintenance of information (or task set) in 
working memory, a switching between task requirements (i.e. 
switching task set) and the inhibition of irrelevant informa-
tion (D'esposito et al., 1995; Menon & Uddin, 2010). In other 
words, the CEN becomes activated in situations that require 
focus or concentration. Notably, the CEN and the DMN often 
show contrasting patterns of activation. If the CEN becomes 
more active, the DMN decreases in activation, and vice versa 
(Chen et al., 2013).
The main brain areas associated with the CEN are the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC), see Figure 3 (Toro et al., 2008). Based on a vast 
amount of empirical evidence, the DLPFC has been referred 
to as the seat of working memory (e.g. Mars & Grol, 2007). 
Furthermore, the strength of the pathways between the 
DLPFC and PPC has been associated with intelligence—the 
ability to effectively deal with complex or novel problems 
and situations (Haier, 2016).
4.2.2 | The CEN and flow
In the literature, it has been suggested that reduced self-
awareness in flow may partly be due to competition for 
the brain's processing resources (e.g. processing time; 
Dietrich, 2004). This refers to the second pathway that we 
mentioned in the previous section. The competition for pro-
cessing resources takes place between attention focused on 
external, task-related stimuli versus self-referential thinking 
(Sridharan et  al.,  2008). In this sense, it has much overlap 
with the above-described oscillations between the DMN and 
the CEN. Stated differently, if one is busy focusing on the 
task at hand, there simply may be too few processing re-
sources available to engage in reflection upon oneself.
This topic is intertwined with the fundamental question 
of what type of cognitive processes occurs during flow in 
the first place. The answer to that question is complex and 
introduces topics such as automatic versus controlled pro-
cessing, and whether or not flow is associated with so-called 
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hypofrontality, that is, lowered activation of (certain parts of) 
the frontal lobes. Dietrich (2004) described information pro-
cessing during flow in terms of explicit versus implicit pro-
cessing. Explicit processing refers to controlled processing 
that includes the involvement of working memory, focused 
attention and conscious awareness of one's action. This type 
of processing is associated with CEN activity. Implicit pro-
cessing refers to more automatic processing in which one 
applies previously (well) learned knowledge or skills that re-
quire little guidance of conscious attention.
The hypofrontality explanation of flow (Dietrich,  2004) 
suggests that during flow one mainly relies on implicit or au-
tomatic processing. This means that well-learned behavioural 
or cognitive procedures smoothly follow each other, without 
much interference of conscious thinking. In several situa-
tions, in which flow occurs, this is indeed what seems to hap-
pen. Illustrative examples are highly skilled athletes, dancers 
or musicians who perform the acts that they have practiced 
intensively for so many times (e.g. Leroy & Cheron, 2020). 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that flow is only related to the exe-
cution of well-learned behavioural or cognitive sequences be-
cause in that case it can be expected to occur only in routine 
tasks, which is not the case. Specifically, flow often occurs 
during periods in which one can apply automatic behaviour 
in combination with a high enough challenge that requires 
a strong attentional focus. The latter implies that controlled 
processing is also involved (Harris et al., 2017b).
The empirical evidence seems to be in accordance with 
the idea that flow is indeed associated with a certain level 
of controlled processing. Although initial studies suggested 
that flow is associated with reduced frontal activity leading 
to the hypofrontal hypothesis (Dietrich, 2004), more recent 
studies have been unable to replicate this (Ulrich et al., 2014, 
although see, Leroy & Cheron, 2020). In fact, stronger acti-
vation of various frontal brain areas during flow conditions 
was found (Ulrich et al., 2014). In order to understand this, 
it may be useful to emphasize the distinction between frontal 
areas related to the CEN versus those that mainly relate to the 
DMN. The mPFC, for example, is part of the DMN which, 
in line with the previous discussion, can be expected to be 
less active during flow. Other frontal areas on the other hand, 
such as the DLPFC, as part of the CEN may be more active, 
as they play a role in keeping the task set active in mind and 
preventing its disruption by irrelevant information.
Another proposition we wish to pose, and that to our 
knowledge has not been directly empirically tested yet, is that 
the type of processing and brain activation during flow in-
teracts with the type of task. Specifically, during some tasks, 
flow will mainly involve effortless, automatic processing 
and behaviour, whereas during other tasks, flow is associ-
ated with high concentration/effort and therefore high levels 
of controlled processing (Harris et  al.,  2017a, 2017b). To 
illustrate this, one may consider an athlete who engages in 
long-distance running. At some point, he or she may feel all 
is going well and gets into the so-called ‘runner's high’, which 
has also been associated with flow (Stoll,  2019). It can be 
expected that DMN as well as CEN activity would both be 
low and hypofrontality could be observed. Yet, it is known 
that this sensation of runner's high is related to the release of 
endorphins that suppress pain, fatigue and negative emotions 
(Boecker et al., 2008). In this regard, it may be a type of flow 
that is different from other task-related flow. For example, 
in tasks in which individuals get fully engaged in cognitive 
activities, such as playing a challenging game, engaging in 
an important chess competition, solving a complex computer 
programming problem or writing a scientific paper, flow may 
be characterized by low DMN activity, possibly combined 
with strong CEN activation.
Such a distinction between the types of tasks can possibly 
also explain some of the contradictory findings in neurosci-
entific flow research. For example, in the fMRI studies of 
Ulrich et al. (2014) and Ulrich et al. (2016), no clear evidence 
was found for hypofrontality. However, in their studies they 
induced flow with solving math problems. This method, in 
real life, would more closely resemble tasks such as chess/
programming/science, compared to the runner's high or the 
absorbed artist. Subsequently, it may not be that surprising 
that, in Ulrich et al.'s study, specific brain areas related to 
strong attentional focus and controlled processing (i.e. CEN 
components) were found to be more active during flow. In 
contrast to the studies of Ulrich et al. is the more recent study 
of Leroy and Cheron (2020), who studied brain activity in 
a professional tightrope performer. Their results were more 
in line with Dietrich's hypofrontality hypothesis. However, 
the task they examined was a clear well-practiced movement 
task, and the flow that occurs during such a task may be more 
similar to the flow during sport performance than during 
complex problem-solving. Accordingly, the possibility that 
the type of processing during flow is partly dependent on the 
type of task is a topic that certainly requires further scrutiny.
4.3 | The Salience Network: Am I still on 
track?
4.3.1 | Basic characteristics of the SN
The third, and final, network we consider in the neurosci-
entific perspective on flow is the so-called SN (Menon & 
Uddin,  2010; Seeley et  al.,  2007). The main brain regions 
of this network are the anterior insula cortex (AIC) and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Those two regions are also 
mentioned as the ones that are consistently active in almost 
all cognitive demands or tasks (Menon, 2015). Thus, they 
likely serve very broad functions. In recent theories, the SN 
has been ascribed the general role of switching between other 
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brain networks (see Figure 4), particularly between the previ-
ously discussed DMN and the CEN (Sridharan et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the SN is involved in the continuous switching 
between task-related versus non-task-related and self-refer-
ential processing. Or in more mundane terms, this switching 
may be related, but is not restricted, to the switching between 
task concentration and mind-wandering. The network re-
ceived its name due to its presumed core function, which is 
detecting the salience of stimuli/events. Salience, in this con-
text, is every stimulus, internal or external, that the system 
signals as worthy of further attention and processing. The SN 
determines the salience of a stimulus, based on input from 
various other systems, including the dopaminergic reward 
and LC-NE systems that we referred to earlier (McCutcheon 
et al., 2019).
The AIC and ACC, as components of the SN, have 
both received extensive attention in brain research; there-
fore, much is known about their basic functions. The in-
sula, in general, presumably plays an important role in 
integrating information from one's ‘internal environment’ 
(Craig, 2014), such as energy level, pain, emotions and sym-
pathetic versus parasympathetic activation (i.e. whether one 
is stressed or not). Those characteristics of the AIC make it 
a suitable candidate as one of the fundaments of self-aware-
ness (Craig, 2014).
The other main component of the SN, the ACC has tradi-
tionally been linked to performance monitoring, which im-
plies that it compares ongoing actions and outcomes with the 
direction of one's goals (Carter et al., 1998). In cooperation 
with other brain structures, such as the nucleus accumbens 
(part of the dopaminergic reward system), the ACC supports 
decisions on whether one is willing to spend effort in order to 
obtain a specific goal (Hauber & Sommer, 2009).
4.3.2 | The SN in flow
Given the performance monitoring properties of the SN and 
the fact that it is considered to act as a switch between the 
DMN and the CEN, it can be hypothesized to play a role in 
flow. Specifically, in situations in which there is a match be-
tween the task at hand and a person's skills or abilities, the SN 
may signal that everything is still going ‘according to plan’ 
and that one is gradually working towards achieving one's 
goals. This particular configuration of the SN may be one of 
the building blocks of the subjective sense of control that pre-
sumably is an important dimension of flow (see Section 2). In 
addition, the performance monitoring role of the SN seems to 
fit well with the notion that flow requires feedback on how 
one is doing (see Section 2). The SN may particularly pro-
vide process feedback information and translates that into 
consciousness knowledge regarding whether performance is 
still optimal or not (Figure 4).
If, during task engagement, the skills/challenge balance is 
disturbed, because, for example, the task becomes more diffi-
cult, performance errors start to occur which are registered by the 
SN. In that case, two things may happen. The first one is that the 
increase in errors indicates that the task has become more chal-
lenging and that more effort or focus is required. Subsequently, 
the CEN may become more active, the DMN may become even 
less active and one's flow experience gets more intense (more 
focus, more effort, less awareness of self or surroundings). Such 
increase in flow intensity when the challenge increases, but is 
still manageable, has indeed been reported in the literature (e.g. 
Csikszentmihalyi & Nakamura, 2010).
The second possibility is that the task challenge increases 
to such an extent that it becomes too difficult, and errors ac-
cumulate. When this happens, flow is diminished. The SN 
will switch the activation pattern from more CEN and less 
DMN to more DMN and less CEN. In other words, one starts 
to become more self-aware again, and gets more easily dis-
tracted, the flow-state has then, in effect, ended.
Given the wide range of functions and tasks in which the SN 
is involved, many questions are still open about the scope of in-
fluence of this network on flow. For example, besides the DMN, 
the SN may also play a role in the level of self-awareness. Craig 
(2014) posed a theory stating that the integration of intero-
ceptive information in the AIC leads to so-called global emo-
tional moments, which he assumed are basic building blocks of 
self-awareness. A global emotional moment can best be under-
stood as an analogy to a frame in a movie. A rapid sequence of 
frames is perceived as a movie. Similarly, a rapid sequence of 
global emotional moments in a processing buffer leads to the 
perception of oneself as an entity in a time, which would be 
the raw material for consciousness. Craig also proposed that the 
fluctuations in the number of global emotional moments in the 
buffer influence fluctuations in levels of self-awareness as well 
as in time perception. During periods of intense negative emo-
tions, for instance, there are many global emotional moments, 
and consequently self-awareness is high and time seems to pass 
by very slowly. An example is a car accident in which people 
often report that they had the idea that they were very aware 
of themselves (as if watching a movie) and everything seemed 
to happen in slow-motion. In flow, however, people have low 
self-awareness and subjective time goes by very quickly. In 
terms of Craig's theory, this would suggest a low number of 
global emotional moments per time-unit. The empirical finding 
that flow is associated with more parasympathetic activity fits 
with this notion because such finding indicates low levels of 
stress during flow and therefore, possibly less global emotional 
moments.
It is not clear yet, how the empirical findings on AIC 
activation in flow have to be interpreted in light of theories 
such as the one discussed above. In their MRI experiment, 
Ulrich et al. (2014) reported bilateral increased activation of 
the AIC during a flow condition. However, the left AIC was 
   | 957VAN DER LINDEN Et AL.
more strongly activated than the right AIC. The latter find-
ing seems in accordance with Craig's so-called asymmetrical 
emotional processing account of the AIC. This account states 
that differences between the left and right AIC may underlie 
that subjective time goes slower during negative emotional 
situations, but seems to go faster during positive emotional 
situations. According to Craig, the positive emotional situ-
ation would be characterized by a stronger activation of the 
left AIC compared to the right AIC. This is what might hap-
pen during flow.
As the theory of AIC-driven global emotional moments 
is relatively new, many questions on how this may relate to 
flow remain open. Nevertheless, we consider it a potentially 
relevant theory that can further delineate the role of the SN 
in flow.
5 |  A NEUROSCIENTIFIC MODEL 
OF FLOW: SYNOPSIS
So far, we have discussed different large brain systems and 
networks in detail and elaborated on how they can map onto 
the various dimensions of flow. In the present section, we 
will briefly revisit the main ideas from the previous sections 
in order to show how the different components can form a co-
herent neuroscientific account of flow. Obviously, given the 
scope and multifaceted nature of flow, it cannot be expected 
that such an account can explain all aspects of this state or 
includes all brain structures/network involved. Nevertheless, 
it can provide a general picture on how the brain establishes 
flow. In addition, although by definition, such a model has to 
be limited in scope, in our view, providing a broad neurosci-
entific model of flow is useful and needed because it would 
allow a more precise investigation of flow and may also lead 
to new lines of research on the topic.
As a recap, the neuroscientific model of flow starts 
with the consistent finding that flow is more likely in in-
trinsically motivating, meaningful or enjoyable tasks (e.g. 
Csikszentmihalyi & Nakamura, 2010). This suggest that, in 
light of all the different behavioural options available at any 
given moment, the brain has, nevertheless, ‘decided’ that it 
is worthwhile to fully engage in it. Dopaminergic reward and 
the LC-NE systems likely play a role in enhanced engage-
ment in the task, together with the almost complete tempo-
rary neglect of all other options. When reward systems are 
active, one is less likely to experience negative or inhibiting 
mood states such as fatigue, hunger or low expectations. On 
the contrary, the higher dopaminergic activity will coincide 
with activating moods and cognitive states such as optimism 
and energy. Moreover, those rewarding aspects should rein-
force the drive to be in a flow, hence its autotelic properties.
There is consistent empirical evidence that a match be-
tween a person's skills and the task requirements enhances 
the probability of experiencing flow (Moneta, 2012; Peifer 
et al., 2014). The performance monitoring aspects of the 
SN seem to be a plausible candidate to play a role in this. 
Components of the SN, that is, the ACC, continuously evalu-
ate feedback and check whether one is still ‘in control’. This 
maps well onto the flow dimensions of control and feedback, 
which have been identified in the literature.
Given that being in flow often occurs on tasks that have 
rewarding elements, the LC-NE system may ensure that the 
level of arousal and response-related processing are optimal. 
As soon as the challenge becomes too high and things start to 
break down (e.g. more errors start to occur), the probability 
of flow being disrupted increases. In that case, the LC-NE 
F I G U R E  4  The salience network as 
the switch between activation of the default 
mode network (DMN) and central executive 
network (CEN) 
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system either switches to a mode that induces a general with-
drawal, or to a stress/distractibility mode, which are both in-
compatible with flow.
During flow, high focus, low self-awareness and speed-
ing of subjective time occur (Hancock et al., 2019). This set 
of characteristics can partly be explained by the interaction 
between the three large networks we discussed, namely the 
DMN, the CEN and the SN. As a central network in self-ref-
erential thoughts, DMN activation would be low, whereas the 
CEN, which supports focused attention, would be active in 
tasks that require concentration. This presumed configuration 
of networks during flow has been partly supported by several 
empirical studies using brain scanning (fMRI) or EEG mea-
sures (Harmat et al., 2015; Ulrich et al., 2014).
All in all, the neuroscientific account of flow as outlined 
here has the potential to link specific configurations of brain 
activity to various well-known behavioural and subjective 
dimensions of flow. Moreover, it can provide insight in the neu-
rocognitive mechanism of the dynamics of flow and the con-
ditions under which it is likely to be induced versus disrupted 
or prevented. Table 2 provides a summary of the various psy-
chophysiological and brain measures and their contributions.
6 |  A NEUROSCIENTIFIC MODEL 
OF FLOW AS A COMPASS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH?
Beyond direct insight into the underlying mechanisms of 
flow, another presumed advantage of a neuroscientific flow 
model is that it can guide future research and can lead to new 
research questions that would not be directly obvious from 
more ‘traditional approaches’ to the topic. Below, we provide 
examples of such questions.
T A B L E  2  Overview of psychophysiological measures and their contribution to understanding the neuroscience of flow
Psychophysiological method General findings/contributions Selection of references Potential future contribution
fMRI • Flow experience associated with 
lowered activation of brain areas 
associated with the Default Mode 
Network (DMN), e.g., medial 
prefrontal cortex
• Increased activity during flow 
experience in brain areas associated 
with top-down attentional control, 
e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left 
inferior frontal gyrus
• Indications of flow experience-related 
activity of dopaminergic brain reward 
systems, e.g., increased putamen 
activity
• Reduced amygdala activation during 
flow experience (= less anxiety/stress)
Ulrich et al. (2014), 
Ulrich et al. (2016)
Examining activation of the LC-NE 
system during flow experience
Structural MRI/PET • More Gray matter volume in flow-
prone individuals
• Higher density of D2 dopamine 




Discovering the structural brain 
differences related to the flow 
proneness
fNIRS • No relationship between flow 
experience and frontal cortex 
oxygenation
Harmat et al. (2015) Testing brain activity during various 
activities that can induce flow. Also 
particularly suited for testing flow 
during social interaction.
EEG • Lower alpha power and increased 
theta power associated with flow 
experience
Katahira et al. (2018) Dynamic EEG assessment during 
flow in real-life (ecologically valid) 
situations
Cardiovascular measures • Higher respiratory depth during flow 
experience indicating more relaxation 
and parasympathetic involvement
• Flow experience is associated with 
moderate levels of arousal
Peifer et al. (2014) Revealing the role of effort (e.g. 
heart rate variability) during flow
Abbreviations: (f)MRI, (functional) Magnetic Resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography; fNIRS, Functional near-infrared spectroscopy; EEG, 
Electroencephalography.
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Many of the functionalities of the brain systems we dis-
cussed are very general and are involved not only in flow, 
but in numerous other tasks and states. Thus, one question is 
whether there is a specific configuration of networks that is 
unique for flow, or whether there is nothing specific to flow 
except that it reflects the extreme point of focused attention. 
In case of the latter, flow would only be a matter of gradi-
ents of attention, and over time, the best strategy might be 
to assimilate flow in the broader and more general literature 
on motivation and attention. If, however, flow is associated 
with a more unique pattern of network states, then it would 
be useful to identify this pattern more precisely. The present 
review partly addresses this topic.
There are several possible ways to address the questions 
mentioned above. Of course, fMRI studies would be able to 
directly show which brain areas are active or inactive during 
flow (e.g. Ulrich et  al.,  2014, 2016). However, inducing 
flow while participants are in a scanner may be quite chal-
lenging and remains somewhat artificial. Alternatives are 
the use of electromyography (EMG) or electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) approaches to study flow in more natural set-
tings (Cheron, 2016). Particularly, the latter method may be 
promising, as with advancing techniques, EEG equipment is 
becoming more wearable and less inconvenient for the par-
ticipants. For example, it would be possible to use such EEG 
equipment in chess players who engage in actual competi-
tions in which they sometimes experience flow. Also relevant 
in this context is that several authors have proposed that, in 
contrast to common use, EEG can not only be used to exam-
ine brain activity but can also be used to assess which brain 
structures are active (Michel & Murray, 2012). Thus, EEG 
may serve as a brain imagining technique in this context. A 
good example of such an approach is the study of Leroy and 
Cheron (2020). They examined EEG in a professional tight-
rope performer and, compared to more stressful task peri-
ods, found distinct patterns of brain activity during flow-like 
periods.
Another open question that may complicate the search for 
a neurological profile of flow and that has received little at-
tention in the literature so far is whether there are ‘different 
states of flow’ that partly depend on the task requirements. 
For example, the flow that occurs during sports (e.g. the run-
ner's high) may be different from the one experienced during 
solving complex problems, which may, again, be different 
from the flow that one experiences during highly engaging 
social interaction. In each of these situations, different net-
work activation patterns may be present. DMN activation, 
for instance, indicative for self-referential thinking, may be 
low during most flow experiences, but not necessarily low 
during flow related to social interaction. Specifically, several 
studies now showed that the DMN is not only active during 
resting states (e.g. day dreaming and thinking about oneself) 
but also during social tasks (Elton & Gao, 2015; Schilbach 
et al., 2008).
A third example of a research question regarding the 
nature of flow that has been difficult to address with more 
traditional approaches is what mood states are experienced 
during the actual flow. In many conceptualizations and op-
erationalizations of flow, it is assumed that enjoyment is 
a key component (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). However, this 
assumption is mainly based on survey research in which 
participants afterwards answer questions on how they felt 
during their flow. One possibility is that the optimal per-
formance during flow leads to satisfaction, happiness and 
enjoyment after the event, which then might be wrongly 
attributed to the mood state during the flow. Consider, 
for instance, an athlete competing with others. During the 
competition, the athlete may be in a flow and near the end 
gives everything to win. Enjoyment or happiness may not 
be the best way to describe the mood the athlete is feel-
ing during such a struggle. Once the competition is over 
and the athlete has won, however, he or she will feel very 
satisfied with the performance and, looking back, reports 
having enjoyed the competition. A neurological and psy-
chophysiological approach may be useful here. For ex-
ample, to examine whether there are any neuroscientific 
indications of good mood during flow. The involvement 
of the reward system, as referred to earlier, does seem to 
suggest that flow may be associated with positive mood 
states. On the other hand, reward systems may mainly be a 
more accurate indication of activating emotions instead of 
positive emotions per se.
7 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Several decades of research confirmed that flow is asso-
ciated with optimal performance and with mental health 
benefits, including a better mood and sense of meaningful-
ness (Csikszentmihalyi,  2014; Demerouti,  2006; Fullagar 
& Kelloway, 2009). Accordingly, the relevance of flow for 
human performance and well-being has been widely ac-
knowledged. Despite this accumulation of knowledge on 
flow, neuroscientific research on the topic remains surpris-
ingly sparse and there is no consensus yet about the neuro-
logical processes involved. In the present review, we aim to 
contribute to this field by discussing various large-scale can-
didate brain systems whose broad functionalities may explain 
the manifestations of flow. Such an account is highly needed 
if we want to advance insight in what is flow, and also what 
is not flow. Including explanations at the neurological level 
allows a more detailed and precise scrutiny of flow and is 
needed to strengthen the position of the phenomenon in the 
literature.
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